state of play

Observed from a certain perspective—as geopolitical theater, that is—the situation in Georgia looks pretty much the way Abe Greenwald describes it [e.a.]:

If [Georgia deliberately staged a provocation of Russia during the Olympics in order to call attention to itself] it is certainly the most cynical bit of statecraft employed by any present-day democracy. (In any event, there is no doubt that Saakashvili is looking for our sympathy now.) But did it work?

Georgia has our attention (or is sharing it with John Edwards). [Since that's true, it means the stagecraft worked. *** ed.] McCain, Barack Obama, and George W. Bush have issued assorted statements on the matter, French president Nicolas Sarkozy has dashed through the motions of European diplomacy, and President Bush has sent Condoleezza Rice dashing after him. Additionally, American Navy vessels are heading toward the Black Sea–to deliver aid. But a week after Russian tanks and jets set Georgia ablaze–and three days since the announcement of a ceasefire–Russian troops patrol Georgian cities with virtual impunity. No nation has defended Georgia and no Georgian ally has even given her the means to defend herself. Moreover, no agreements have been drafted explicitly securing Georgia’s territorial integrity. In this way, Saakashvili got the West dead wrong. [Oops! Like I said: the stagecraft worked. But from this description of reality, it looks like Georgia lost. Maybe stagecraft isn't all it's cracked up to be! --ed.]

Greenwald also draws an interesting conclusion from these still-ongoing events (and pseudo-events—i.e., the photo ops and meme-planting opportunities that constitute a propaganda war) [e.a.]:

Victim status doesn’t get you what it used to. There was a time when an American friend or a strategically critical state under attack got more than color commentary from the White House and a boat full of Ace bandages. When Russia rolled into Afghanistan in 1979 we didn’t give Afghans our sympathy; we gave them guns–big ones. When Saddam tried to annex Kuwait, we went in and sent him back home. Today a real invasion will get a symbolic vote, a high profile condemnation, and a Facebook group.

Hmmm. Can this possibly be true? Do world events impinge on us Americans only as the cartoon representations that both the blogosphere and the MSM traffic in? Does the violence in Georgia and South Ossetia touch us, or do we view this merely (if we view it at all) as a media event—fodder for blogospheric and watercooler chat: “news,” information, entertainment, amusement, gossip, conspiracy theories?

One commenter presents an alternate view:

This article is based on a huge, unproven assumption, that Georgia was trying to get victim status. Russia wants control of that pipeline going into Western Europe. Why? So Putin can control Europe. I think this analysis is amazingly simple minded (leftist).

Who started what will come out as the facts become known. The why is clear. Russia wants control of Western Europe’s oil and gas supplies and invaded Georgia to secure that control.

I certainly agree that most of the “analysis” on offer—whether from the MSM or from the blogosphere—is ignorant, no matter how well intended. Because of the propaganda- and cyber-war aspects of this conflict (not to mention the fact that it’s not yet over), we simply don’t know much of anything.

Instead, we are left to speculate about our own reactions, and to consider the reactions of others around the world. Greenwald also writes:

But it’s the old America that friends and states with democratic aspirations remember, and they continue in vain to appeal to us. I am currently in Azerbaijan and if I’ve been asked once I’ve been asked a hundred times: “What does America think about the Armenian occupation of our country?” Whether it’s a reporter or a graduate student doing the asking, their desperation is a little heartbreaking and I answer honestly: “You’re [sic] conflict isn’t even a blip on our radar.”

Yep, that’s pretty much true. That conflict isn’t on our radar … except as it relates to our domestic politics.

update: so sophisticated and nuanced is David Remnick in his views that I can’t quite figure out which side he comes down on, but he does make an important point:

Putin is not Hitler or Stalin; he is not even Leonid Brezhnev. He is what he is, and that is bad enough.

What Putin is, of course, is a cold-blooded killer, albeit a smoother one than what we’re used to from Russian autocrats:

[H]e is the autocrat who calls on the widow of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

So what? He is still a cold-blooded killer. And his ascendant Russia is a scary kinda place, worth keeping an eye on.

———-

*** The stagecraft worked in that it caught and grabbed our attention. But stagecraft is a tactic.

If you’re using a tactic, you are—admit it or not—at war. It’s best to admit it, and then to study it so that you get good at it (as, for example, Barack Obama did by studying Saul Alinsky and putting the methods he learned into practice.)