good information from Iraq

Please note that this post is titled “good information,” not “good news.” There is, of course, a big difference. What follows is not a story, in other words. It’s an expert’s examination and analysis of the facts on the ground.

“The news,” on the other hand, is about storytelling (information fed to us in the form of mini-conflicts, with protagonists and antagonists and bones of contention) by “evenhanded” self-styled experts (reporters, anchors, and hosts) who seek (or, in the case of reporters, are presumed to have sought) reliable information from people who claim to be experts in their respective fields. See? That’s why I call it infotainment: it presents controversy, not information. The point of it is to get you all riled up so that you’ll keep coming back for more. ‘Cause being riled up isn’t so bad—it can be fun. Why, it’s entertaining!

And that’s why (although I’m on record as a longtime Anderson Cooper fan) I’m with Eat the Press’s Rachel Sklar in the Rachel-vs.-Ankush-on CNN-vs.-Fox disagreement.

All the cable channels are doing more or less the same thing. None of them are reporting the kind of information you’ll get below. ‘Cause it’s not bloody, it’s not sexy, it’s not outrageous, it’s not dramatic, it’s not horrifying, and it’s not heartbreaking—it’s the nitty-gritty about what is actually happening on the ground. Also, because it reports some progress, it carries the strong suggestion that there is a job for us to finish in Iraq before we pull out. I’ll leave that the political ramifications of that for the politicos to battle over; I’m much more interested in the quality (or, rather, the lack of quality) of the information we are getting from TV “news.”

Anyhoo…back to that good information (which is definitely not all good news—but nothing catastrophic) from Iraq.

The Small Wars Journal is the place to go if you want to find out about how things are going in Iraq from people who know what they’re talking about. The latest is from Bing West:

Based upon a February 2007 trip revisiting locales in Anbar and Baghdad that I had tracked for years, permit me to offer the following observations.

Overview. What is shaping up in Iraq? There are four ongoing wars. 1) Shiite mafias in the south, 2) Anbar Sunni extremists 3) Shiite ethnic cleansing around Baghdad 4) Sunni extremist car bombings in Baghdad.

1. In the South the U.S. is doing little. The energy sector funnels billions to corrupt officials, criminals, militias and insurgents. The Brits weren’t able to impose control. The hope is that the south remains a long-term mafia-type mess, and does not spill north to Baghdad.

2. In Anbar about 60% of the tribes are tilting toward the Marines and fighting the al-Qaeda types. Police ranks are swelling with tribal members. Anbar is improving, but how the Sunni tribes will work with the Iraqi Army, let alone the central government, is moot.

Prognosis for the next six months: Progress but no breakthroughs. The central government has to woo the sheiks and offer terms, figure out how police chiefs and Iraqi army commanders share power in the cities, and crack down on the insurgents captured in Anbar (put them away for life). Jails in Anbar are filling up, and the central government is not stepping up.

3. In Baghdad, as the Shiite ethnic cleansing advances, the front lines are easily marked by the blocks of abandoned houses. Checking the cleansing can be done by military means – barriers, patrols and the like. The Americans are likely to stop this and turn around the trend.

4. Also in Baghdad, the Sunni extremists strike with suicidal murderers and car bombs. It is unlikely, given a million cars, that a technique will be developed to curtail this inside six months. In most countries, bombers are stopped by effective policing and spy networks, and Iraq is years away from that. This is the Achilles Heel. No matter the progress on other fronts, the persistence of gore and Shiite mass deaths is likely to continue to fuel hatred. [e.a.]
What, then, is the biggest problem? How the Americans can infuse into the Iraqi army and police in Baghdad a sense of mission and even-handedness such that the Americans can withdraw from neighborhoods in eight to twelve months without backsliding.

Read the rest here. (via Jules Crittenden, who describes Bing West thus:

USMC Vietnam vet, former asst secdef, counterinsurgency scholar and Dot homeboy

So it sounds like there are good reasons to trust West’s judgment—if that’s what you look for when you’re trying to judge the value of the information you receive (i.e., reporting), that is.

Bottom line, though: West doesn’t sound particularly optimistic. Nor does he sound pessimistic. He sounds like a man who understands that we are involved in a long mission to do what we can do and leave the rest to the Iraqis: stand down as they stand up (remember that?).

Here are a couple of points from Bing’s post that stuck with me:

I’ve seen enough examples of tough Iraqi leadership at the battalion and police chief level to believe that some leadership is emerging. Right now, though, the glue is the presence of the American troops. They have to be out on the streets first, then the Iraqi forces fall in behind them. …
Erratic standards of patrolling. The patrol is the basic tool in the US military inventory. Without patrols, there is no US presence or influence. The variation in the size and duration of patrols from location to location is astounding. … It is caused by an extreme variation in intuitively assessing the threat and setting the balance between force protection and mission accomplishment. A little ops analysis by experienced infantry of how often we are really on the streets and how one determines patrol size and mounted vs. dismounted would go a long ways. [e.a.] …
I am a broken record on this, but I do urge that we systematically fingerprint and take census in critical locales, and provide the Iraqis with simple gear and templates to do likewise. OpSec firewalls can be built in to avoid subversion. [e.a.] …
The Iraqi judiciary system cannot be straightened out for another five years. At higher levels, this is disputed. I remain on the side of the battalions. We must lock up tens of thousands until the violence subsides. [this is certain to be very controversial --ed., who added the emphasis]

4. Under-utilized information tool. The loud speakers linked to news broadcasts several times a day in Ramadi is a terrific innovation that should be immediately installed at IA, IP and JSS locales. [e.a.]

Much food for thought here.