Yesterday I explored the idea that Iraq is at the point of “Tet redux“—a propaganda victory for the enemy, because whatever the situation on the ground—and there are relatively positive views, especially from the soldiers—the war has relentlessly been declared a failure (and a misadventure) by the media; the people spoke during the election (though it’s unclear exactly what they said); and, at the same time, our president lopped off the head of his war manager and decided to look at Iraq with “fresh eyes” (if you consider his father’s aging-and-struggling-to-remain-relevant pals “fresh.” I consider them impudent, arrogant, and self-interested: particularly about their legacy, which has taken a beating at the hands of the neocons). Behind the scenes, this has the makings of a Shakespearean drama. (Too bad Bob Woodward alienated himself from the administration; this story will one day make for really juicy reading.)

Meanwhile, the rest of us are left dealing with reality. And any way you slice that, whether it was handed to them or they grabbed it—this looks like a propaganda victory for al Qaeda (about which it is gloating, with relish).

I accept the notion of PR and propaganda victories—(in a democracy with a free press and freedom of speech, PR and propaganda are the same thing). To simplify things, I will call them PRopaganda (TM) victories: they’re real, and they do damage (but not by themselves: the most damaging ones are those that fall on fertile ground—when perceptions are already shaky, a propaganda victory for one side can tip the scales, for a while).

Yesterday I reached the conclusion that the American people hadn’t yet bought into the PRopaganda victory idea that al Qaeda has defeated us in Iraq. Now, Bill Roggio asks the question we need to address: will the PRopaganda victory be turned into a military defeat for the United States and thus a military victory for al Qaeda?

Over the summer, U.S. intelligence uncovered a 66 page document that explained al-Qaeda strategy to manipulate Western elections. The document, which was published on the web in a private al-Qaeda forum, has yet to be declassified.

To influence the American elections, the U.S. mainland didn’t need to be hit. The schwerpunkt of American public opinion was in Iraq. The terror attacks and sectarian killings were ratcheted up to achieve the desired effect: weaken the resolve of the American public, create a sense of hopelessness and despair in the mission. Now, the question is: will the Bush administration and the Democratic Congress hand al-Qaeda a real military victory to accompany the propaganda victory by prematurely withdrawing from Iraq before the security has stabilized?

Those seem to be the stakes.

John Hinderaker, for one, expects the worst from Poppy’s Pals.

As far as I can see, the “realists” haven’t had a new idea in thirty years. What does Israel have to do with the fact that Shia and Sunni Muslims want to tear each other to pieces? Nothing. Absolutely nothing. I’ll say it again: the idea that pressuring Israel to compromise its security will somehow, magically, solve the Iraqis’ problems is delusional. Maybe Baker et al., know something I don’t, but the idea that Iran and Syria will cooperate to bring peace to that region appears equally far-fetched.

So, under the Baker Commission’s recommendations, what will become of the 12 million Iraqis who voted for freedom and for a normal life? President Bush has said more times than I can count, in speeches spanning the last four years, that all people want to be free, and that freedom is God’s gift to all mankind. If he doesn’t believe that, then what does he believe?

If the Iraqis are to be sold out, at least let them be sold out by the Democrats. No one expected anything better from them.

PAUL adds: If the reported contours of this deal (and President Bush’s receptiveness to it) are correct, at least I now understand why the administration waited until after the election to embrace it. If he had changed course in this fashion earlier, no one would (with the possible exception of Baker himeself) have voted for Republicans.

update: I’ve added a link to (and a quote from) the transcript of today’s Reliable Sources.

For foreign-policy wonks who want to get up to speed on the new team that’s just like the old team, except not really.

The other day, I linked to a long piece published in the New Yorker earlier this year, “Breaking Ranks,” by Jeffrey Goldberg, about the ideological divisions within the Republican foreign-policy mavens of the last three decades who have crisscrossed the Bush 41 and Bush 43 administrationo. That article was as serious an insider attack on Bush’s policies (the neo-connish “Bush Doctrine”) as any that has been published during his presidency (including Ron Suskind’s, Woodward’s, and David Kuo’s). As such, it’s definitely worth reading (or re-reading, as the case may be) now that the political ground is shifting in unknowable ways (that is, all astute observers can see that’s it’s shifting, but no one knows where it will settle: there are too many variables—among them the fact that the Democrats are deeply divided too).

Anyway: There’s reason to think things aren’t nearly as simple as a shift from neo-condom [!] to realism. Here, for example, is a very short piece in the Washington Post that adds much more nuance to the picture I had of Bob Gates:

Gates’s nomination unquestionably stands for one proposition: a long-awaited recognition that the administration’s war in Iraq has been a disaster. But the broader interpretation of the appointment as representing a victory of Bush 41 over Bush 43 — or of one school of thought over another — breaks down when you look at Gates’s background and the history of the 1980s and early ’90s.

For one thing, that analysis depends on a selective view of the Bush 41 administration. Yes, it included Gates; then-national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, a determined opponent of the current Iraq war; and Baker, who is now head of a bipartisan group searching for a new Iraq policy. But Vice President Cheney was a charter member of the Bush 41 administration. So were Cheney’s former aide Stephen Hadley, the current national security adviser, and Condoleezza Rice — who have been among the principal architects of the war in Iraq.

Moreover, as that 1989 debate over Gorbachev illustrates, the Bush 41 foreign policy team was hardly united. Its members bickered about the Soviet Union, about China, about the Middle East. One of the few things it was in complete harmony on was the belief that American troops shouldn’t go on to Baghdad at the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. At the time, everyone thought that would be a bad idea, including Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz, then undersecretary of defense.

Well, then, does Wednesday’s appointment of Gates represent a change of philosophy, the triumph of realism over neoconservatism? That doesn’t quite work, either. Rumsfeld was never a neoconservative; he was an obstreperous contrarian, committed not to putting forward any particular philosophy but to aggressively challenging whatever ideas his bureaucratic opponents and critics put forward.

Things are about to become very interesting. This was underscored for me on Reliable Sources this morning, where (finally!) Howard Kurtz conceded*** that television loves conflict,

KURTZ: We’ll come back to that in a moment.

Candy Crowley, let’s face it, journalists were bored with one- party rule and they hope the Democrats conduct plenty of investigations in Congress and issue subpoenas so that they can feast on the conflict.

True or false? True?

CANDY CROWLEY, CNN SR. POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT: You know — I mean, you know, yes, in some ways. And here’s why: because journalists love a story.

So I don’t think it’s — you know, that gives the implication that we’re rooting for something one way or the other. I think what journalists root for is a good story. You know, something that gets the adrenaline pumping. And so, you know, yes, in the sense that we want a good story, no in the sense that we want to see somebody or other brought down.

KURTZ: Right. I wasn’t suggesting journalists were taking sides, so much as they were happy to hold the coats of the two sides while they go at it.

and where he prepared the ground for (eventually—say, a couple of months into 2007) more “scrutiny” of the Democrats after the initial warm media bath that met their ascension to power in Congress.

Why more scrutiny? because the media looks for conflict (a good story) and there’s no better story than partisan conflict. What’s more: the audience laps it up—especially when it’s based on something real.

Democrats versus Republicans is a much better show than the Media versus the Republicans—just my opinion, of course. But I’ll bet it’ll be more popular with the audience, too.

—————-
***This isn’t exactly an endorsement of the kind of infotainment (aka entertaining news) that I’m in favor of, but Eat the Press’s Rachel Sklar quotes Kurtz’s begrudging praise of the New York Post on last week’s Reliable Sources, and I repeat here:

[I]t’s easy to make fun of “The Post”. It can be sensational and simplistic. Sometimes irresponsible, and sometimes wrong… I wouldn’t want to see other metropolitan dailies imitate the tantalizing tabloid, except in this one respect: “The Post” is fun to read. Too many papers are cautious and timid and feel like homework.

Note to Howie: you say “sensational and simplistic” as if that’s a bad thing!

Many of Glenn Reynolds’s readers appreciated his linking to William Stuntz’s “ Doubling Down in Iraq,” in which Stuntz says that drawing down our troops is exactly the wrong thing to do and that we need to increase our troop levels. He explains why:

Why do insurgent gangs, who have vastly smaller resources and manpower than the American soldiers they fight, continue to try to kill those soldiers? The answer is, because they believe they only have to kill a few more, and the soldiers will leave. They need not inflict a military defeat (which would be impossible, given the strength of the American military)–all they need to do is survive until American voters decide to throw in the towel, which might happen at any moment.

The proper response to that calculation is to make emphatically clear that the fight will not end until one side or the other wins, decisively.

I agree that what Stuntz says makes a lot of sense in principle. I would caution, however, that what he proposes is not “the” solution that everyone seems to be looking for. My problem with his proposed solution is that it implies there will be “victory” at the end of the operation, that there will be a knockout punch and that we’ll be able to claim victory afterward.

I am deeply skeptical of this. I’ll note that the Israelis have been trying to make use of the “doubling down” principle forever. Look how well it has worked for them. And that’s because the “insurgents” in Iraq are not like soldiers of the South. They are indoctrinated fanatics.

So: I would urge people to stop looking for “the” solution to Iraq. That is a very American way of looking things, and it doesn’t comport with the situation on the ground in Iraq.