Andrew Sullivan’s readers seem to like the idea of Al Gore.

Okay, maybe that was a little gratuitous.
I have a bunch of beefs with Al Gore—primary among them is his conversion into a fire-breather. (I will spare you the photograph…for now. But you can find it on Google Images.). The timing is suspicious (he converted only after he lost the presidency) and it is way too late. When it mattered—during the recount in Florida, when the battle was for his own presidency—he didn’t have the balls to fight aggressively for what he wanted. That gives me deep reservations about his ability to lead a nation at war. There are other reasons, but that’s a pretty big one.
Read a bit about him for yourself, from Jeffrey Toobin’s Too Close to Call. (Which was published around 9/11 and got lost in the shuffle—it’s a good, if agonizing, read.)
Al Gore had lived in Washington for most of his life, and had absorbed, as if by osmosis, many of the attitudes of the establishment. He agonized about the views of the columnists, newspaper editorialists, and other elite opinion makers among who he had lived for so long. Gored cared as much about their approval as he did about winning, and he ran his recount effort accordingly. Ironically, and poignanntly, Gore’s solicitude toward the Washington establishment was never reciprocated. To a great extent, the vice president lacked passionate supporters among journalists and politicians, and even ordinary citizens. In the intense conditions of the Florida recount, this absence was notable. The recount required sacrifice, devotion, even a measure of fanaticism from those on the ground. At best, Gore inspired only a distant admiration from his supporters, and he paid the price in Florida. (p. 7)
When the first hints of this Republican attack on “selective” recounts began leaking out, [the Gore team was] flabbergasted. They had thought they were being statesmanlike by asking for recounts in only four counties….Instead, they were castigated for cherry-picking only the areas that would help their candidate the most….Gore and his lieutenants were so worried about appearing too aggressive that they were always heding, compromising, and, in effect, undercutting their own work…
James Baker suffered no such agonies. He believed that his candidate had won on Election Day, and his job was to preserve that victory—by any means necessary. If he had to repudiate decades of Republican thought about judicial activism and state sovereignty, Baker would—and did—do it in a flash. (pp.51-52)
The vice president thought that once the result was certified, the press and public would decide that the election really was over and begin to view him as a sore loser. If they filed a contest after certification, Gore’s team feared it might lead to the loss of…”credibility.”…Gore feared that a contest would alienate the editorialists and pundits whose approval he so craved and whose views, as it turned out, mattered so little. (p. 103)
It gets even worse. Gore didn’t even understand the stakes, or how to win:
Clinton’s philosophy about how to win posed a dramatic contrast to Gore’s….Whereas Gore regarded the [Florida] battle as primarily legal, Clinton saw it as political—and fierce. Gore wanted no demonstrators in the streets; Clinton wanted lots of them. Gore worried about pressing his case in court; Clinton thought the vice president should have sued everybody over everything. Gore believed in muting racial animosities about the election; Clinton thought that Democrats should have been screaming about the treatment of black voters. Gore believed in offering concessions, making gestures of good faith; Clinton thought the Republicans should be given nothing at all but should rather be fought for every single vote. “He’s being screwed,” Clinton would say of Gore….
Where was labor? Why was Gore so worried about stretching out the fight? There was plenty of time—just get the right result. Why hadn’t Gore asked for a recount of the whole state? Why such a timid public-relations message? Count all the votes—not good enough What about We won and they’re stealing the election? (pp. 193-94)
Al Gore seems like a good guy. He has ideals, and he wants to do the right thing. He’s careful and thoughtful. He’s logical and calculating. (Think Jimmy Carter, and shudder.) He may even have the right ideas about American and how we should behave at home and abroad. (I wouldn’t know, because his positions seem to have changed.)
Republicans will attack a Gore 2008 campaign as Democrats looking to turn back the clock to simpler (pre-9/11) times. That is a fatal image problem for a party that already looks weak on national security.
And one more thing: where the hell is Tipper? why is Al roaming around all over the place all alone? Would she even support his candidacy?



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[...] Still, I hope we can move past this quickly. This was a particularly shameful dirty political move on the part of the Republicans—the kind that Republicans seem to specialize in when they think they’re on the side of right: they will do whatever it takes to win. (See my discussion of James Baker in this post.) —– [...]
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